




1 Behavioral Ethics and the Rational Actor Model
Philosophical views about morality have traditionally been supported by abstract
reasoning and introspection, with at best passing reference to actual human behav-
ior. Behavioral ethics develops models of human morality based upon the fact that
morality is an emergent property of the evolutionary dynamic that gave rise to our
species. Propositions concerning moral behavior are framed and tested using the
methods of game theory, using subjects from a variety of social backgrounds and
cultures. In this paper I will outline some major themes in behavioral ethics, and
suggest how they relate to philosophical ethics.
Homo sapiens is one of many social species, but alone is the product of an
evolutionary dynamic known as gene-culture coevolution. Like language and the
social emotions (shame, pride, contempt, empathy) morality is an emergent human
universal.
Individual fitness in humans depends on the structure of social life. Because
culture is limited by and facilitated by human genetic propensities, human cog-
nitive, affective, and moral capacities are the product of an evolutionary dynamic
involving the interaction of genes and culture (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1982,
Boyd and Richerson 1985, Dunbar 1993, Richerson and Boyd 2004). This coevolu-
tionary process has endowed us with preferences that go beyond the self-regarding
concerns emphasized in traditional economic and biological theory. Gene-culture
coevolution explains why we have a social epistemology facilitating the sharing of
intentionality across minds, as well as why we have such non-self-regarding values
as a taste for cooperation, fairness, and retribution, the capacity to empathize, and
the ability to value character virtues (e.g., honesty, loyalty, trustworthiness).
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In behavioral ethics, we recognize that people consider moral statements to
have truth values, but we consider these values as being valid only for the specific
social group involved, rather than having universal scope. We thus treat ethics in
a manner similar to linguistics, where grammaticality and correct usage are impor-
tant and analytically tractable, yet highly specific to a particular society of speak-
ers. As it turns out, there are a host of human values that are universal in that they
are present in virtually every known society (Brown 1991). We account for this
universality in terms of the general requirements for social living of our species.
Moral behavior is often held to be incompatible with rational choice. This is
incorrect. The rational actor model of economic theory presupposes that people
have consistent preferences, but does not require that preferences be self-regarding
or materialistic. We can just as easily chart how people value honesty or loyalty in
the same way that we can chart how they value fried chicken or cashmere sweaters.
Some caveats are in order, however, in interpreting the rational actor model.
First, individuals do not consciously maximize “utility,” or anything else. As long
as people have consistent preferences, we can represent their choices as the so-
lution to a maximization problem. This is analytically useful and gives accurate
predictions, but it does not mean that individuals really “maximize.” This analyti-
cal ploy is similar to the physicist predicting the path followed by a light wave by
assuming the light minimizes path length traveled. This works, but of course light
waves do not really minimize anything.
Second, individual choices, even if they are self-regarding (e.g., personal con-
sumption) are not necessarily welfare-enhancing. In the sense of the rational actor
model, it may thus be rational to smoke, have unsafe sex, and even cross the street
without looking. Third, individual preferences are not fixed, but rather are a func-
tion of an individual’s current state (e.g., state of hunger or sexual arousal). Fourth,
the fact that we model individuals as rational decision-makers does not imply that
we are methodological individualists. In particular, we may adopt the rational actor
model yet assert that is not possible to derive either social norms or moral values
from individual rationality. In fact, it is quite possible that both social norms and
the moral realm are emergent properties of human evolution that cannot be derived
from the aggregation of individual rational choice.
Beliefs are the Achilles’ heel of the rational actormodel. The standardmodel of
rational choice treats beliefs as purely subjective (the so-called subjective priors),
whereas individual beliefs are in fact a part of a social network of interdependent
socially constructed beliefs. The rational actor model is really a lower-dimensional
projection of a general model of human action, which includes an interpretive and
a deliberative dimension as well. Full human reason operates in this larger action
framework.
Because the use of the word “rational” in the rational actor model is so circum-
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scribed compared with the general usage of the word, we often call the rational
actor model the beliefs, preferences, and constraints model (BPC), because this
capture the notion of consistent preference, the centrality of beliefs, and the notion
making tradeoffs subject to informational and material constraints.
In the BPC model, choices give rise to probability distributions over outcomes,
the expected values of which are the payoffs to the choice from which they arose.
Game theory extends this analysis to cases where there are multiple decision mak-
ers. In the language of game theory, players are endowed with strategies, and have
certain information, and for each array of choices by the players, the game specifies
a distribution of payoffs to the players. Game theory predicts the behavior of the
players by assuming each is rational; in other words, each maximizes a preference
function subject to beliefs as well as informational and material constraints.
The experiments described below are all based on using game theory to set up
the choices available to subjects, the knowledge they have on which their choices
are based, and the payoffs to each subject as a function of their joint strategy
choices. We assume the subjects are rational (i.e., consistent) decision-makers, so
that their choices reflect their subjective trade-offs among heterogeneous payoffs—
some material and some moral and/or other-regarding.
2 Experimental Findings on the Rationality of Altruistic Behavior
There is nothing irrational about caring for others. But do preferences for altruistic
acts entail transitive preferences as required by the notion of rationality in decision
theory? Andreoni and Miller (2002) showed that in the case of the Dictator Game,
they do. Moreover, there are no known counterexamples.
In the Dictator Game, the experimenter gives a subject, called the Dictator, a
certain amount of money and instructs him to give any portion of it he desires to
a second, anonymous, subject, called the Receiver. The Dictator keeps whatever
he does not choose to give to the Receiver. Obviously, a self-regarding Dictator
will give nothing to the Receiver. Suppose the experimenter gives the Dictator m
points (exchangeable at the end of the session for real money) and tells him that
the price of giving some of these points to the Receiver is p, meaning that each
point the Receiver gets costs the giver p points. For instance, if p D 4, then it
costs the Dictator 4 points for each point that he transfers to the Receiver. The
Dictator’s choices must then satisfy the budget constraint s C po D m, where
s is the amount the Dictator keeps and o is the amount the Receiver gets. The
question, then, is simply, is there a preference function u.s; o/ that the Dictator
maximizes subject to the budget constraint s C po D m? If so, then it is just
as rational, from a behavioral standpoint, to care about giving to the Receiver as to
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care about consuming marketed commodities.
Varian (1982) developed a generalized axiom of revealed preference (GARP)
that ensures that individuals are rational as in the sense of traditional consumer
demand theory. Andreoni and Miller (2002) worked with 176 students in an el-
ementary economics class and had them play the Dictator Game multiple times
each, with the price p taking on the values pD0:25; 0:33; 0:5; 1; 2; 3; and 4, with
amounts of tokens equaling mD 40; 60; 75; 80, and 100. They found that only 18
of the 176 subjects violated GARP at least once and that of these violations, only
four were at all significant. By contrast, if choices were randomly generated, we
would expect that between 78% and 95% of subjects would have violated GARP.
As to the degree of altruistic giving in this experiment, Andreoni and Miller
found that 22.7% of subjects were perfectly selfish, 14.2% were perfectly egalitar-
ian at all prices, and 6.2% always allocated all the money so as to maximize the
total amount won (i.e., when p > 1, they kept all the money, and when p < 1, they
gave all the money to the Receiver).
We conclude from this study that, at least in some cases, and perhaps in all, we
can treat altruistic preferences in a manner perfectly parallel to the way we treat
money and private goods in individual preference functions. We use this approach
in the rest of the problems in this chapter.
2.1 Conditional Altruistic Cooperation
A social dilemma is a situation in which a number of people can gain by cooper-
ating, but cooperating is costly, so each individual does better personally by not
cooperating, no matter what the others do. For instance, suppose if a member of
a group of size n  2 pays the cost c > 0, he benefits each of the others by an
amount b > 0. If b.n   1/ > c, we have a social dilemma: at cost c, an individual
can help the group by the amount .n   1/b > c, but a selfish individual will not
do so. If all cooperate, each will earn b   c > 0, but in a group of self-regarding
individuals, each will earn zero.
Conditional altruistic cooperation is a predisposition to cooperate in a social
dilemma as long as the other players also cooperate. Consider the above social
dilemma, with n D 2, called the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In this game, let CC stand
for “both players cooperate,” letDD stand for “both players defect,” let CD stand
for “Player 1 cooperates but his partner defects,” and let DC stand for “Player
1 defects and his partner cooperates.” A self-regarding Player 1 will prefer DC
to CC , will prefer CC to DD, and will prefer DD to CD, while an altruistic
cooperator will prefer CC to DC , will prefer DC toDD, and will prefer DD to
CD; i.e. the self-regarding individual prefers to defect no matter what his partner
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does, whereas the conditional altruistic cooperator prefers to cooperate so long as
his partner cooperates.
Kiyonari et al. (2000) ran an experiment based on this game with real mone-
tary payoffs using 149 Japanese university students. The experimenters ran three
distinct treatments, with about equal numbers of subjects in each treatment. The
first treatment was a standard “simultaneous” Prisoner’s Dilemma, the second was
a “second-player” situation in which the subject was told that the first player in the
Prisoner’s Dilemma had already chosen to cooperate, and the third was a “first-
player” treatment in which the subject was told that his decision to cooperate or
defect would be made known to the second player before the latter made his own
choice. The experimenters found that 38% of the subjects cooperated in the si-
multaneous treatment, 62% cooperated in the second player treatment, and 59%
cooperated in the first-player treatment. The decision to cooperate in each treat-
ment cost the subject about $5 (600 yen). This shows unambiguously that a ma-
jority of subjects were conditional altruistic cooperators (62%). Almost as many
were not only cooperators, but were also willing to bet that their partners would be
(59%), provided the latter were assured of not being defected upon, although under
standard conditions, without this assurance, only 38% would in fact cooperate.
2.2 Altruistic Punishment
Strong reciprocity is an altruistic behavioral propensity often exhibited in daily life
and in the laboratory as well. A strong reciprocator is a conditional altruistic coop-
erator who is willing to punish non-cooperators even when this is personally costly
and is unlikely to be compensated by higher material returns in the future. The
simplest game exhibiting the altruistic punishment of the strong reciprocator is the
Ultimatum Game (Gu¨th et al. 1982). Under conditions of anonymity, two players
are shown a sum of money, say $10. One of the players, called the Proposer, is
instructed to offer any number of dollars, from $1 to $10, to the second player,
who is called the Responder. The Proposer can make only one offer and the Re-
sponder can either accept or reject this offer. If the Responder accepts the offer,
the money is shared accordingly. If the Responder rejects the offer, both players
receive nothing. The two players do not face each other again.
There is only oneResponder strategy that is a best response for a self-regarding
individual: accept anything you are offered. Knowing this, a self-regarding Pro-
poser who believes he faces a self-regarding Responder offers the minimum possi-
ble amount, $1, and this is accepted.
However, when actually played, the self-regarding outcome is almost never
attained or even approximated. In fact, as many replications of this experiment
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have documented, under varying conditions and with varying amounts of money,
Proposers routinely offer Responders very substantial amounts (50% of the total
generally being the modal offer) and Responders frequently reject offers below
30% (Gu¨th and Tietz 1990, Camerer and Thaler 1995). Are these results culturally
dependent? Do they have a strong genetic component or do all successful cultures
transmit similar values of reciprocity to individuals? Roth et al. (1991) conducted
the Ultimatum Game in four different countries (United States, Yugoslavia, Japan,
and Israel) and found that while the level of offers differed a small but significant
amount in different countries, the probability of an offer being rejected did not.
This indicates that both Proposers and Responders share the same notion of what
is considered fair in that society and that Proposers adjust their offers to reflect this
common notion. The differences in level of offers across countries, by the way,
were relatively small. When a much greater degree of cultural diversity is studied,
however, large differences in behavior are found, reflecting different standards of
what it means to be fair in different types of societies (Henrich et al. 2004).
Behavior in theUltimatumGame thus conforms to the strong reciprocity model:
fair behavior in the Ultimatum Game for college students is a 50–50 split. Re-
sponders reject offers under 40% as a form of altruistic punishment of the norm-
violating Proposer. Proposers offer 50% because they are altruistic cooperators, or
40% because they fear rejection. To support this interpretation, we note that if the
offers in an Ultimatum Game are generated by a computer rather than by the Pro-
poser, and if Responders know this, low offers are rarely rejected (Blount 1995).
This suggests that players are motivated by reciprocity, reacting to a violation of
behavioral norms (Greenberg and Frisch 1972). Moreover, in a variant of the game
in which a Responder rejection leads to the Responder getting nothing but allows
the Proposer to keep the share he suggested for himself, Responders never reject
offers, and proposers make considerably smaller (but still positive) offers (Bolton
and Zwick 1995). As a final indication that strong reciprocity motives are opera-
tive in this game, after the game is over, when asked why they offered more than
the lowest possible amount, Proposers commonly said that they were afraid that
Responders will consider low offers unfair and reject them. When Responders re-
jected offers, they usually claimed they want to punish unfair behavior. In all of
the above experiments a significant fraction of subjects (about a quarter, typically)
conformed to self-regarding preferences.
We should note that while strong reciprocity is a form of moral behavior, it
is not generally backed by a high level of moral cognition. Rather, individuals
cooperate because it pleases them to do so, and they punish non-cooperators out
of anger or pique, not because it is a moral duty to do so. Thus Sanfey et al.
(2003) subjected players of the Ultimatum Game to fMRI brain scans, and found
that when Responders rejected unfair offers, they exhibited activity in the anterior
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insula, which is usually associated with emotional responses.
2.3 Strong Reciprocity in the Labor Market
Fehr et al. (1997) (see also Fehr and Ga¨chter 1998) performed an experiment to
validate what is know as a gift exchange model of the labor market. The experi-
menters divided a group of 141 subjects into “employers” and “employees.” The
rules of the game are as follows. If an employer hires an employee who provides
effort e and receives a wage w, his profit is  D 100e   w. The wage must be
between 1 and 100, and the effort is between 0.1 and 1. The payoff to the employee
is then u D w   c.e/, where c.e/ a cost of effort function such that c.0:1/ D 0,
c.1:0/ D 20. All payoffs involve real money that the subjects are paid at the end
of the experimental session. We call this the Experimental Labor Market Game.
The sequence of actions is as follows. The employer first offers a “contract”
specifying a wagew and a desired amount of effort e. A contract is made with the
first employeewho agrees to these terms. An employer can make a contract .w; e/
with at most one employee. The employee who agrees to these terms receives the
wage w and supplies an effort level e that need not equal the contracted effort
e. In effect, there is no penalty if the employee does not keep his promise, so
the employee can choose any effort level, e 2 Œ0:1; 1, with impunity. Although
subjects may play this game several times with different partners, each employer-
employee interaction is a one-shot (nonrepeated) event. Moreover, the identity of
the interacting partners is never revealed.
If employees are self-regarding, they will choose the zero-cost effort level, e D
0:1, no matter what wage is offered them. Knowing this, employers will never pay
more than the minimum necessary to get the employee to accept a contract, which
is 1 (assuming only integer wage offers are permitted). The employee will accept
this offer and will set e D 0:1. Because c.0:1/ D 0, the employee’s payoff is
u D 1. The employer’s payoff is  D 0:1  100   1 D 9.
In fact, however, this self-regarding outcome rarely occurred in this experi-
ment. The average net payoff to employees was u D 35, and the more generous
the employer’s wage offer to the employee, the higher the effort provided. In effect,
employers presumed the strong reciprocity predispositions of the employees, mak-
ing quite generous wage offers and receiving higher effort, as a means to increase
both their own and the employee’s payoff, as depicted in figure 1. Similar results
have been observed in Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl ((1993), (1998)).
Figure 1 also shows that, though most employees are strong reciprocators, at
any wage rate there still is a significant gap between the amount of effort agreed












Figure 1: Relation of contracted and delivered effort to worker wage (141 subjects). From
Fehr, Ga¨chter, and Kirchsteiger (1997).
apples” among the set of employees but because only 26% of the employees deliv-
ered the level of effort they promised! We conclude that strong reciprocators are
inclined to compromise their morality to some extent.
To see if employers are also strong reciprocators, the authors extended the game
by allowing the employers to respond reciprocally to the actual effort choices of
their workers. At a cost of 1, an employer could increase or decrease his em-
ployee’s payoff by 2.5. If employers were self-regarding, they would of course do
neither because they would not (knowingly) interact with the same worker a sec-
ond time. However, 68% of the time, employers punished employees who did not
fulfill their contracts, and 70% of the time, employers rewarded employees who
overfulfilled their contracts. Employers rewarded 41% of employees who exactly
fulfilled their contracts. Moreover, employees expected this behavior on the part of
their employers, as shown by the fact that their effort levels increased significantly
when their bosses gained the power to punish and reward them. Underfulfilling
contracts dropped from 71% to 26% of the exchanges, and overfulfilled contracts
rose from 3% to 38% of the total. Finally, allowing employers to reward and punish
led to a 40% increase in the net payoffs to all subjects, even when the payoff re-
ductions resulting from employer punishment of employees are taken into account.
We conclude from this study that subjects who assume the role of employee
conform to internalized standards of reciprocity even when they are certain there
are no material repercussions from behaving in a self-regardingmanner. Moreover,
subjects who assume the role of employer expect this behavior and are rewarded
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for acting accordingly. Finally, employers reward good behavior and punish bad
behavior when they are allowed, and employees expect this behavior and adjust
their own effort levels accordingly. In general, then, subjects follow an internalized
norm not because it is prudent or useful to do so, or because they will suffer some
material loss if they do not, but rather because they desire to do this for its own
sake.
2.4 Altruism and Cooperation in Groups
The Public Goods Game, an n-person social dilemma, captures many areas of
altruistic cooperation in social life, including voluntary contribution to team and
community goals. Researchers (Ledyard 1995, Yamagishi 1986, Ostrom et al.
1992, Ga¨chter and Fehr 1999) uniformly find that groups exhibit a much higher
rate of cooperation than can be expected assuming the standard model of the self-
regarding actor.
A typical Public Goods Game consists of a number of rounds, say 10. In each
round, each subject is grouped with several other subjects—say 3 others. Each
subject is then given a certain number of points, say 20, redeemable at the end of the
experimental session for real money. Each subject then places some fraction of his
points in a “common account” and the remainder in the subject’s “private account.”
The experimenter then tells the subjects how many points were contributed to the
common account and adds to the private account of each subject some fraction, say
40%, of the total amount in the common account. So if a subject contributes his
whole 20 points to the common account, each of the 4 group members will receive
8 points at the end of the round. In effect, by putting the whole endowment into the
common account, a player loses 12 points but the other 3 group members gain in
total 24 (8 times 3) points. The players keep whatever is in their private accounts
at the end of the round.
A self-regarding player contributes nothing to the common account. However,
most of the subjects do not in fact conform to the self-regarding model. Subjects
begin by contributing on average about half of their endowments to the public
account. The level of contributions decays over the course of the 10 rounds until in
the final rounds most players are behaving in a self-regarding manner. This is, of
course, exactly what is predicted by the strong reciprocity model. Because they are
altruistic contributors, strong reciprocators start out by contributing to the common
pool, but in response to the norm violation of the self-regarding types, they begin
to refrain from contributing themselves.
How do we know that the decay of cooperation in the Public Goods Game
is due to cooperators punishing free riders by refusing to contribute themselves?
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Subjects often report this behavior retrospectively. More compelling, however, is
the fact that when subjects are given a more constructive way of punishing defec-
tors, they use it in a way that helps sustain cooperation (Orbell, Dawes, and Van de
Kragt 1986, Sato 1987, Yamagishi 1988a,1988b, 1992)
Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000), for instance, used 6- and 10-round Public Goods
Games with groups of size 4, and with costly punishment allowed at the end of
each round, employing three different methods of assigning members to groups.
There were sufficient subjects to run between 10 and 18 groups simultaneously.
Under the Partner treatment, the four subjects remained in the same group for all
10 periods. Under the Stranger treatment, the subjects were randomly reassigned
after each round. Finally, under the Perfect Stranger treatment, the subjects were
randomly reassigned but assured that they would never meet the same subject more
than once.
































   
Figure 2: Average contributions over time in the Partner, Stranger, and Perfect Stranger
Treatments when the punishment condition is played first (Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000).
Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000) performed their experiment for 10 rounds with pun-
ishment and 10 rounds without. Their results are illustrated in figure 2. We see that
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when costly punishment is permitted, cooperation does not deteriorate, and in the
Partner game, despite strict anonymity, cooperation increases almost to full coop-
eration even in the final round. When punishment is not permitted, however, the
same subjects experienced the deterioration of cooperation found in previous Pub-
lic Goods Games. The contrast in cooperation rates between the Partner treatment
and the two Stranger treatments is worth noting because the strength of punish-
ment is roughly the same across all treatments. This suggests that the credibility of
the punishment threat is greater in the Partner treatment because in this treatment
the punished subjects are certain that, once they have been punished in previous
rounds, the punishing subjects are in their group. The prosociality impact of strong
reciprocity on cooperation is thus more stronglymanifested, the more coherent and
permanent the group in question.
2.5 Character Virtues
Character virtues are ethically desirable behavioral regularities that individuals
value for their own sake, while having the property of facilitating cooperation and
enhancing social efficiency. Character virtues include honesty, loyalty, trustwor-
thiness, promise keeping, and fairness. Unlike such other-regarding preferences as
strong reciprocity and empathy, these character virtues operate without concern for
the individualswith whom one interacts. An individual is honest in his transactions
because this is a desired state of being, not because he has any particular regard for
those with whom he transacts. Of course, the sociopath Homo economicus is hon-
est only when it serves his material interests to be so, whereas the rest of us are
at times honest even when it is costly to be so and even when no one but us could
possibly detect a breach.
Common sense, as well as the experiments described below, indicate that hon-
esty, fairness, and promise-keeping are not absolutes. If the cost of virtue is suf-
ficiently high, and the probability of detection of a breach of virtue is sufficiently
small, many individuals will behave dishonestly. When one is aware that others
are unvirtuous in a particular region of their lives (e.g., marriage, tax paying, obey-
ing traffic rules, accepting bribes), one is more likely to allow one’s own virtue to
lapse. Finally, the more easily one can delude oneself into inaccurately classifying
an unvirtuous act as virtuous, the more likely one is to allow oneself to carry out
such an act.
One might be tempted to model honesty and other character virtues as self-
constituted constraints on one’s set of available actions in a game, but a more
fruitful approach is to include the state of being virtuous in a certain way as an ar-
gument in one’s preference function, to be traded off against other valuable objects
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of desire and personal goals. In this respect, character virtues are in the same cate-
gory as ethical and religious preferences and are often considered subcategories of
the latter.
Numerous experiments indicate that most subjects are willing to sacrifice ma-
terial rewards to maintain a virtuous character even under conditions of anonymity.
Sally (1995) undertook a meta-analysis of 137 experimental treatments, finding
that face-to-face communication, in which subjects are capable of making verbal
agreements and promises, was the strongest predictor of cooperation. Of course,
face-to-face interaction violates anonymity and has other effects besides the ability
to make promises. However, both Bochet et al. (2006) and Brosig et al. (2003) re-
port that only the ability to exchange verbal information accounts for the increased
cooperation.
A particularly clear example of such behavior is reported by Gneezy (2005),
who studied 450 undergraduate participants paired off to play three games of the
following form, all payoffs to which were of the form .b; a/, where player 1, Bob,
receives b and player 2, Alice, receives a. In all games, Bob was shown two pairs
of payoffs,A:(x; y) and B:(z; w) where x, y, z, and w are amounts of money with
x < z and y > w, so in all cases B is better for Bob and A is better for Alice. Bob
could then say to Alice, who could not see the amounts of money, either “Option
A will earn you more money than option B ,” or “Option B will earn you more
money than optionA.” The first game was A:(5,6) vs. B:(6,5) so Bob could gain 1
by lying and being believed while imposing a cost of 1 on Alice. The second game
was A:(5,15) vs. B:(6,5), so Bob could gain 1 by lying and being believed, while
still imposing a cost of 10 on Alice. The third game was A:(5,15) vs. B:(15,5),
so Bob could gain 10 by lying and being believed, while imposing a cost of 10 on
Alice.
Before starting play, Gneezy asked the various Bobs whether they expected
their advice to be followed. He induced honest responses by promising to reward
subjects whose guesses were correct. He found that 82% of Bobs expected their
advice to be followed (the actual number was 78%). It follows from the Bobs’
expectations that if they were self-regarding, they would always lie and recommend
B to Alice.
The experimenters found that, in game 2, where lying was very costly to Alice
and the gain from lying was small for Bob, only 17% of Bobs lied. In game 1,
where the cost of lying to Alice was only 1 but the gain to Bob was the same as in
game 2, 36% of Bobs lied. In other words, Bobs were loathe to lie but considerably
more so when it was costly to Alices. In game 3, where the gain from lying was
large for Bob and equal to the loss to Alice, fully 52% of Bobs lied. This shows
that many subjects are willing to sacrifice material gain to avoid lying in a one-shot
anonymous interaction, their willingness to lie increasing with an increased cost
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to them of truth telling, and decreasing with an increased cost to their partners of
being deceived. Similar results were found by Boles et al. (2000) and Charness
and Dufwenberg (2004). Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002) and Burks et al. (2003) have
shown that a socio-psychological measure of “Machiavellianism” predicts which
subjects are likely to be trustworthy and trusting.
2.6 Norms of Cooperation: Cross-Cultural Variation
Experimental results in the laboratory would not be very interesting if they did not
aid us in understanding and modeling real-life behavior. There are strong and con-
sistent indications that the external validity of experimental results is high. In one
very important study, Herrmann et al. (2008) had subjects play the Public Goods
Game with punishment with 16 subject pools in 15 different countries with highly
varying social characteristics (one country, Switzerland, was represented by two
subject pools, one in Zurich and one in St. Gallen). To minimize the social di-
versity among subject pools, they used university students in each country. The
phenomenon they aimed to study was antisocial punishment.
The phenomenon itself was first noted by Cinyabuguma et al. (2006), who
found that some free riders, when punished, responded not by increasing their con-
tributions, but rather by punishing the high contributors! The ostensible explana-
tion of this perverse behavior is that some free riders believe it is their personal
right to free-ride if they so desire, and they respond to the “bullies” who punish
them in a strongly reciprocal manner—they retaliate against their persecutors. The
result, of course, is a sharp decline in the level of cooperation for the whole group.
This behavior was later reported by Denant-Boemont et al. (2007) and Niki-
forakis (2008), but because of its breadth, the Herrmann, Tho¨ni, and Ga¨chter study
is distinctive for its implications for social theory. They found that in some coun-
tries, antisocial punishment was very rare, while in others it was quite common. As
can be seen in figure 3, there is a strong negative correlation between the amount
of anti-punishment exhibited and the World Democracy Audit’s assessment of the
level of democratic development of the society involved.
Figure 4 shows that a high level of antisocial punishment in a group translates
into a low level of overall cooperation. The researchers first ran 10 rounds of
the Public Goods Game without punishment (the N condition), and then another
10 rounds with punishment (the P condition). The figures show clearly that the
more democratic countries enjoy a higher average payoff from payoffs in the Public
Goods Game.
Howmight we explain this highly contrasting social behavior in university stu-
dents in democratic societies with advanced market economies on the one hand,
13
Figure 3: Countries judged highly democratic (political rights, civil liberties, press free-
dom, low corruption) by the World Democracy Audit engage in very little antisocial pun-
ishment, and conversely. (Statistics from Herrmann, Tho¨ni, and Ga¨chter, 2008.)
and more traditional societies based on authoritarian and parochial social institu-
tions on the other? The success of democratic market societies may depend criti-
cally upon moral virtues as well as material interests, so the depiction of economic
actors as Homo economicus is as incorrect in real life as it is in the laboratory.
These results indicate that individuals in modern democratic capitalist societies
have a deep reservoir of public sentiment that can be exhibited even in the most
impersonal interactions with unrelated others. This reservoir of moral predispo-
sitions is based upon an innate prosociality that is a product of our evolution as
a species, as well as the uniquely human capacity to internalize norms of social
behavior. Both forces predispose individuals to behave morally, even when this
conflicts with their material interests, and to react to public disapprobation for free-
riding with shame and penitence rather than antisocial self-aggrandizement.
More pertinent to the purposes of behavioral game theory, this experiment
shows that laboratory games can be deployed to shed light on real-life social regu-
larities that cannot be explained by participant observation or cross-country statis-
tical analysis alone.
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Figure 4: Antisocial punishment leads to low payoffs (Statistics from Herrmann, Tho¨ni,
and Ga¨chter, Online Supplementary Material, 2008).
3 Conclusion
The problems behavioral ethics poses for moral philosophy include the finding
that individuals tend to treat morality the same way they treat a standard consumer
good: the higher the price of behaving morally, the less likely they are to do so.
Moreover, subjects exhibit forms of moral behavior, including strong reciprocity,
which is not considered moral by most contemporary ethical theories. It can be
argued that popular views of ethics are no more relevant to modern moral philos-
ophy than popular accounts of physical phenomena are to modern physics. If, for
instance, we discover that cannibalism is morally prohibited, the fact that humans
have practiced cannibalism for tens of thousands of years is no more a problem
than our believing the big bang theory of the origins of the universe, despite the
fact this theory corresponds to the origins story of any known society. On these
grounds, universalist moral theories, including utilitarian and deontological, can
simply ignore popular morality as a source of insight, and can reject the notion that
observed human behavior is the ultimate arbiter among ethical theories.
While I believe physicists are correct in rejecting folk physics as a basis for
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adjudicating among alternative approaches to the laws of physics, the same can-
not be said of philosophers who reject behavioral ethics. While physicists have a
proven track record of developing ever more powerful models of physical reality,
philosophers have only a long history of alternative models of morality none of
which explains anything about the material world, and none of which is embraced
by more than a few experts in the field. Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas are
read today not just as historical reliquia, but as living documents from which new
insights can be drawn. Even within a contemporary philosophical tradition it is
rare for two philosophers to agree on all major issues. Moral philosophy is thus
more like art or literature in creatively illuminating the human condition without
generating the sort of demonstrable truths that would be needed to justify ignoring
actual human moral behavior.
If morality is identified with moral behavior, the most salient and immediate
implication is that moral truths are relative to particular cultures: individuals can
disagree on the content of morality in a manner that cannot be adjudicated through
a careful examination of the evidence or because the individuals differ concerning
matters of fact that, if resolved, would lead their moral differences to evaporate.
Moral relativism of the sort suggested by behavioral ethics is widely rejected by
moral philosophers because moral relativism appears not to leave a role for a rea-
soned investigation of morality at all. De gustibus, as the saying goes, non est
disputandum. More important, if we relinquish the notion of a universal morality,
then must we not accept a situation in which there is no real right or wrong, but
only differences in what people believe to be right or wrong? Does it not follow
from this that since our moral beliefs have no status privileged by our superior
expertise, education, or scholarly dedication, are we not obliged to tolerate moral
beliefs and practices that we consider vile, abhorrent, and disgusting?
The answer philosopherDavid Wong gives to these questions in Nature Moral-
ities (2006) is in the negative. Wong’s alternative to universality, which he calls
pluralistic relativism, holds that “there is no single true morality. However, it rec-
ognizes significant limits on what can count as a true morality.” (p. xii) The reason
for these limitations is that morality is the product of the evolutionary history of
our species, serving the role of social cohesion by endowing all, or at least most,
members of a group whose survival depends on cooperation with a set of com-
mon commitments, expectations, and conventions that promote group solidarity.
Wong’s explanation is clearly dependent upon the facts of human existence, and is
far from the sort of empirical blindness that is favored by many philosophers.
I suspect there will be a bright future for pluralistic relativism in meta-ethics.
The sort of virtue theory first proposed by Aristotle and revived in recent years
by G. E. M Anscombe, Philippa Foot, Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen inter-
acts fruitfully with pluralistic relativism, and thus also complements the scientific
16
findings of behavioral ethics
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